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Possibilism and Reflections on Total Systems  
Arne Naess 1975C 
Possibilism 
1. Definition of “logically independent,” consistency, freedom from 
contradiction 
  
In what follows, two sentences S1 and S2 are called logically 
independent if and only if each of the conjunctions S1 & S2, S1 & ~S2, 
~S1 & ~S2 are logically consistent. (Here the ~ sign represents negation 
and can be read as “not”.) The truth of each of the conjunctions is said 
to be logically possible. Freedom from contradictions is taken to be the 
same as consistency. Consistency is left undefined. S1 & ~S1 and S2 & 
~S2 are examples of logically inconsistent conjunctions. 
  
A set of sentences S1, S2 . . . Sn (n≥2) is called logically independent if 
and only if each conjunction of members of the set 
(1) {S1 & S2& . . . &Sn, S1&S2 . . . &~Sn . . . , ~S1&~S2& . . . &~Sn} 
is logically consistent. The set consists of the 2n conjunctions of the 
sentences or their negations. Using S1 to refer to S1 or its negation, we 
symbolize the set as follows 
(2) {S1&S2& . . . Sn} 
 
An example: Of “Live and let live” we form the set live and let live, 
live and do not let live, do not live but let live. In order to avoid 
imperatives we take, for the sake of the illustration, “live and let live” to 
be an abbreviation for “it is ethically valid to live and it is ethically 
valid to let live” and we take the other sentences to be similar 
abbreviations. If somebody objects that even so, the sentences cannot 
be true or false, let us add the prefix “It cannot be true or false that . . .” 
to each of the four sentences. 
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2. Relevant evidence, consistency in texts offering evidence, one-
dimensional texts, “true,” “likely” 
  
If in a text G1, G2 . . . , Gm are logically independent sentences offered 
as reasons or evidence or ground for the truth of F1, and H1, H2, . . . Hk 
are logically independent sentences with the same kind of relation to F2, 
one or more inconsistencies within the set 
(3){G1&H1, G1&H2 . . . Gm&Hk} 
will be taken as sufficient basis for considering the text as a whole to be 
inconsistent.1
  
The joint assertion F1 & F2 in the text at hand implies, besides the 
connectability of E1 with E2, two further sets of assertions 
(4) {G1EF1, & . . . , &GmEF1} 
(5) {H1EF2&, . . . , HkEF2} 
where G1EF1 and H1EF2 are abbreviations for “G1 is connectible with 
F1” and “H1 is connectible with F2,” “connectability” is taken in a weak 
sense so that very different kinds of explicit or implicit assertions of 
relevance, evidence, reason, or ground are covered as specifications of 
connectability.  
  
The notion of connectability in its basic features we take from R. von 
Mises. Presumably, the more precise and complex the stipulations in a 
theory, the more complicated will be the question of connectability of 
the sentences of the theory with sentences of daily life or other theories. 
  
If the set (3) contains at least one instance of inconsistency, the joint 
assertion  
(6) F1&F2&(4)&(5) 
involves an inconsistency.  
  
Considering a text to be logically equivalent to a conjunction of its 
sentences, and (6) being part of the text, the text as a whole is to be 
considered inconsistent. 
 
The most simple case of a text analyzed in what follows is one 
consisting of a single series of logically independent elementary 
sentences none of which explicitly or implicitly are intended to give 
reason, evidence, or ground for any other, or in any other manner 
capable of “interference” with the others so as to raise questions of 
consistency.2 Examples: “Snow is white. Caesar died. Life gets short.” 
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In this example we stipulate that the language is English except that (1) 
of all classes of synonyms one member is selected. The rest are 
eliminated as nonsense. Secondly, every word or string of words within 
a sentence has a meaning which when conceptualized, shows a specific 
set of conceptual implications endangering consistency. The following 
text may also be considered to be an example of a “one-dimensional” 
text: “God is good. Men are imperfect. The will is free”. 
 
From the logical independence of a set of sentences S1, S2 . . . Sn 
follows the consistency of every conjunction of the set (2). It follows 
therefore that any text corresponding to (2) is consistent if the set of 
sentences is logically independent. Applied to the last example, this 
means that the following set of texts are consistent: 
God is good. Men are imperfect. The will is free. 
God is good. Men are imperfect. The will is not free. 
. . .  
God is not good. Men are imperfect. The will is not free. 
 
If S is a sentence, we shall say that S is true if and only if S, or, less 
ambiguously, “S” is true if and only if S. The following formulation 
may also be used: “S” is true if and only if it is the case that S. We need 
also the expression “it is likely that S is true” and “it is more likely that 
Si is true than Sj is true.” We shall use these expressions within the 
broad range of ordinary usages. Among these uses there is one that suits 
us well, but it seems incapable of being made precise beyond certain 
modest levels of preciseness.3
  
After these preliminaries we should be in a better position to attack our 
main problem. 
 
3. Philosophical systems, total views 
  
My discussion will centre on the question of truth or likelihood of very 
special, very complicated, most often many-dimensional sets of 
sentences, namely texts expressing “philosophical” systems. It is not 
essential, but convenient and historically justified to use the vague term 
“philosophical.” In a first approximation to a rough definition of such a 
system, we shall use the following definiens expression: A 
philosophical system is 
 
“A set of sentences expressing an ontology, logic, semantics, 
methodology, epistemology, ethics, and theory of value.” 




The terms “total systems,” “complete synthesis,” and “complete 
philosophy” might be used, but there are problems of self-reference that 
immediately crop up if “total” and “complete” are used in absolute 
ways. We shall, when using “total” or “complete,” take them to be 
abbreviations for “near total” and “nearly complete,” postponing any 
discussion of just what would have to be added, if anything, in order to 
reach totality or completeness. And, of course, the question must be 
taken up, which degrees of nearness are near enough to make our 
consideration of systems interesting as a separate study from the study 
of ordinary limited doctrines within the various branches of science.  
 
As examples of sets of sentences expressing a total view, the following 
are taken to be paradigmatic: 
1. The works of Spinoza, excluding his Short Treatise 
2. The works of Thomas Hobbes, DeCorpore, De homine, 
Elements of Law, Leviathan 
 
Spinoza did not publish any separate texts of logic, but there is 
sufficient material in his works to indicate what his main opinions were 
in matters of logic. The nature of Spinoza’s works may be said to 
“express” a total view, if the term “express” is used that does not 
require detailed articulation as in encyclopedias. 
Aristotle, Thomas, Descartes, Kant, Hume, Hegel, and some others may 
also be said to express total views, but it would not always be easy to 
agree which part of their productions should be chosen as expressing a 
definite view. (Philosophers change their opinions, but I think we 
should be glad that they do.) L’ệtre et le néant of Sartre and Sein und 
Zeit of Heidegger look, at first glance, as if worked out in different 
ways from Spinoza’s Ethica, but closer scrutiny reveals, I think, 
sufficient similarities in structure to use the same pyramidal model for 
representing them. 
 
Consider that some propositions give ground, reasons, or evidence for 
others. The relations between the two sets are of great variety and 
cannot be brought under one or two precise headings without a 
simplification that may be fatal to any deeper understanding of the 
system. Here we limit ourselves to a few observations: the relations 
result in chains of propositions, A giving grounds for G, B for C, and so 
on, but scarcely A for B and B for A, or A for A. At least we shall limit 
ourselves to cases in which the grounds, reasons, and evidence form 
non-reflexive, non-symmetric, but transitive relations. And as a 
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common word for these relations, we shall use “grounds” (Begründung) 
and sometimes “reasons” as in “chains for reasons” 
(Begründundsketten) instead of “chains of grounds.” “Grounds” is a 
better word for the intended deepening of foundations, but it does have 
certain heaviness. 
 
When, in a system, F is given as ground or evidence for G, we do not 
symbolize this by an inference in prepositional logic, since if F/G is 
valid in this logic, G carries less or, at the most, an equal amount of 
information as F. Thus, F>G (F implies G, or if F then G) is not true if 
the system is well ordered in its main feature. A theorem G would count 
as unnecessary to state just because F>G (F implies G). 
 
Interest in great systems of the past diminished when the opinion spread 
that “deduce,” “demonstrate,” “give good reason for,” and “if . . . so” 
could be symbolized by the material implication or the valid inference 
of prepositional logic. Systems must not be looked upon as bad results 
of efforts to create vast sets of tautologies. The amount of new 
information carried by a theorem is always greater than zero, even if the 
theorem follows without qualification from certain premises. If a term 
like “follow” (sequi) in Descartes, Spinoza, or other systems is taken to 
be a term of formal logic, the system collapses and can at the most be 
used for the exercises in detecting logical flaws. 
 
In Sartre’s L’être et le néant the phenomenological foundations are laid 
down in its introduction. There is a superabundance of terms and few 
definitions. In order to reveal the pyramidic structure, a reconstruction 
is badly needed. The initial links in the long chains of reasons will then 
start with sentences such as “aucune apparition n’est priviligée comme 
apparition qui manifest l’existant A,” “l’existant A est la série des 
apparitions qui manifest A,” “une apparition suppose quelqu’un à qui 
elle est une apparition,” etc.4
 
A look at Spinoza’s Ethics is more rewarding. It starts manifestly with 
eight definitions and seven axioms. These mark out the initial links in 
the long chains of reasoning through the first book. But this is only a 
superficial account of what is happening: The “definitions” are not 
single propositions. Under the headings “Definitiones,” we find a 
complicated subtext:  
II. That thing is said to be finite in its kind that can be limited by another thing of 
the same kind. E.g., a body is said to be finite because we can conceive another 
larger than it. Thus, a thought is limited by another thought . . .   
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Here already we have a vastly complicated propositional structure, very 
difficult to reformulate adequately in chains of reasoning from a set of 
initial propositions. To definition six (of God) there is an “explanation” 
added and the same is the case with definition eight (of eternity). One 
of the axioms is not explicitly referred to anywhere in the Ethics. 
(Axiom 2). If we go further, and look at the subtexts marked 
“demonstration” they give not only grounds, reasons, or evidence of 
various kinds, but also offer new insights, sidelines, additional 
information, and so on. 
 
Nevertheless, there is marked tendency away from a mere position of 
logically independent positions, which might be shuffled without the 
slightest injury to the doctrines expressed. 
 
As initial links, not only explicit axioms, postulates, and definition must 
find their place, but so also must a vast number of sentences of small 
interest to the major objectives of the great enterprise. Thus, examples 
involve claims “x is an example of y” which mostly are not 
substantiated by any reasons, evidence, or grounds. The first 
exemplification in the Ethics is already quoted. It results in the adoption 
of several initial propositions; for example, “if x is a body, and y is a 
man, y can conceive a body z that is larger than x.” But even if the 
initial sentence in a reformulation of the Ethics (adding some 
epistemology and methodology from “On the Correcting of the 
Understanding”) would run into the thousands, the number of later links 
would be much greater if spelled out in detail. 
 
4. The non-different, non-zero validity of consistent total systems 
 
In what follows, I shall, for the sake of simplicity, assume that a system 
starts with a relatively small number of propositions that are conceived 
to be basic and indispensable.5
 
If the set of initial formulations of a system is taken to describe the 
outline of “a possible world” or a “state description” (as these terms 
have been used in relation to sets of logically independent propositions 
of propositional logic), the kind of non-zero validity of the different 
systems can be partially clarified by saying that they have non-different, 
non-zero, a priori probability, in the sense of Carnap’s inductive logic. 
The natural thing would be to assign a probability of 1 to each initial 
proposition of each system. The propositions that are said by the 
systematizers to be based upon the initial ones, would be, or might be, 
assigned probabilities. It is difficult, however, to imagine an “inductive 
logic” sufficient to represent the great differences in relations of 
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propositions. Philosophical systems from the time of Plato exemplify 
rather deep differences, but it seems that the sources of differences are 
far from exhausted. 
 
A consistent total system might have positive validity one can show 
oneself by attempting to codify one’s own beliefs. For every belief B1 
entertained, one would trust that B1 or non-B1, and presumably B is true 
or probable. If certain conjunctions, say B5 & non-B7 and B8 & non-B5 
are inconsistent, this subtracts from the possible systems comprising 
one’s beliefs. However, we may tentatively assume that the conjunction 
of all main beliefs would be consistent. 
 
The term “main” is inserted because a stated system need not—and 
psychologically cannot—comprise all beliefs if they are required to be 
articulated. Which beliefs are needed and which are not in order to form 
a total system depends to a large degree upon the kind of system 
envisaged. Taking systems in Western Philosophy since 1500 as 
models, we might ask for a system that answers basic questions in 
logic, semantics, methodology, ontology, epistemology, theory of 
values, and ethics. What is taken as basic would be a question of what 
sub-kind of system is envisaged. 
 
Lack of tertium comparationis 
 
One and the same painting can be evaluated from different systems, A 
and B, of aesthetics if (1) the representatives of the systems have a 
common “geography” so that the paintings, as things, can be identified, 
(2) if there is a common basis of understanding concerning what it 
involves to evaluate. If there is a basic difference here, it does not 
amount to anything that the painting was valued differently from points 
of view A and B. If there is a common basis and, say, an aesthetic 
judgment is taken to have 10 dimensions in the sense that the painting 
can score positively or negatively in 10 ways, difference in evaluation 
may stem from differences in priority lists of the 10 scores.6 Thus, 
according to A, drawing or form always plays an important role, “badly 
drawn” pictures getting a large minus, whereas to B, there is only for a 
small sub-kind of paintings any stress on drawing, and even then it 
counts low. We may imagine these differences given reasons “deeper” 
in the systems. 
  
Complications arise from aestheticians who insist on a concept “work 
of art” used before evaluation is started. Is this picture a work of art or 
is it not? Cases of incomparability and incommensurability arise as 
soon as two aestheticians stipulate two different concepts. “Highly 
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valuable” and “of modest value” are incommensurable evaluations, if 
the first refers to price and the second to value as a work of art, but the 
same holds good if this value is defined as basically different. 
  
Now let us proceed from narrow systems, such as those of aesthetics, to 
wider ones. The wider the system, the poorer is the common frame of 
reference. If the semantics of two systems are different and 
incompatible, they may even get incomparable, because semanticist A 
uses a set of rules RA to interpret the texts of semanticist B, and 
semanticist B uses the set of rules RB. RA and RB are incompatible. 
They are eternally speaking past each other. 
 
How can I know this? What metascience do I have at my disposal? 
 
These questions touch upon some grave problems of self-reference and 
total systems, if totality is taken in strict senses. In order not to be 
bogged down prematurely in those questions, it is convenient to talk of 
a series of expanding systems, the differences between two adjacent 
members of the series being fixed. We can then study how 
communication gradually breaks down. Let semantics A0 differ only 
slightly from B0, let A1 and B1 be a pair of semantics constructed as A0 
and B0, but with slight modifications which makes the difference 
between A1 and B1 greater than between A0 and B0. If this process is 
repeated, I predict there will be a stepwise destruction of 
communicability between A-semanticists and B-semanticists because 
they interpret each other’s text more and more falsely, or have to give 
up finding the meaning of more and more sentences. 
  
After a certain number of steps, communicability will be practically 
zero. 
  
In practice, the semanticists may get along very well, because they may 
use gestures. And here the relevance of broadening the systems is clear. 
If the systems A and B are gradually generalized in the direction of 
complete totality, two end-situations are of particular interest to us. In 
one, understandability is kept at a maximum in spite of increasing 
disagreements. Here the end product is a pair of systems with certain 
comparability of language, but with mutually inconsistent assertion 
(and evaluations) at a maximum degree. It may be conceived of as a 
kind of “father-son” relation, where the son reacts systematically 
against the father in all conceivable ways, but thereby is imprisoned 
within the realm of points of view conceivable by the father. The range 
of differences, if father and son have their systems, is limited by 
considerations of comparability and understanding. Each difference 
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must be conceived as a difference on both scales, otherwise there is no 
reaction “against”—no antagonism. 
  
Another end-product is a pair of systems with minimal 
understandability compatible with maximum agreement. That is, 
considering the differences along the series (A0B0), (A1B1) . . .  
(AnBn) . . . we experience an increasing difficulty in understanding the 
articulations of B on the basis of A and vice versa. But insofar as we 
succeed, we see an amazing degree of agreement in assertions and 
evaluations. The difficulties are language difficulties in a broad sense.  
  
Possibilism as a term introduced here has to do, not primarily with 
understandability, but with the differences in assertions and evaluations 
taken to be understandable somehow.  
  
The non-zero validity of two mutually incompatible near-total systems 
in an expanding series of pairs A0B0, A1B1, A2B2 . . . stems from two 
factors: (1) the systems include sentences we anyhow take to be true or 
probable or valid, and (2) any attack from the basis of one system on 
the other may involve a principium negantem mistake: it will be based 
on the assumption that “the other” accepts a principle he does not 
accept—and cannot be argued to accept except by further mistakes of 
the principium negantem class. 
  
Thus, we are forced to retrace our steps, which I take to be equivalent to 
an admittance of non-zero validity of both systems. This admission 
will, however, not be done by A or B, but by a hypothetical C, who is 
able to follow what happened when A and B tried to argue against each 
other. 
  
This hypothetical systems botanist must somehow be able to understand 
the series of A- and B-systems. One may argue that he must have a kind 
of metasystem comprising A and B. Under certain conditions this is not 
possible without contradiction. 
 
5. Possibilism, and possibilism for N.N
  
An argumentation ending with the conclusion “false,” or less 
specifically, “invalid,” is always itself invalid, if what is judged false or 
invalid, is a consistent set of initial formulations of a total system. This 
point of view might be modified a little and termed possibilism, 
stressing the possibility of a system in face of argumentations to the 
contrary. 
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Let F1, F2 . . . , Fn be a consistent set of initial formulations of a total 
system. Every member of the class of sets {F1& . . . &Fn} is then a 
possible initial formulation of a system. And there is at least one 
consistent set.  
  
This I shall call possibilism. It is mainly a defensive position directed 
against efforts to narrow down the range of possible “worlds” in which 
we might be—for all we know. Personally, I would suggest that there 
is, potentially, not only one set of initial formulations of a total system, 
but an indefinite multiplicity. I think what are called the main 
philosophical traditions have materials for constructing consistent sets, 
and I think the possible varieties of such traditions has not been 
exhausted, and perhaps never will be. 
  
Looking upon possibilism from a personal angle, it is clear that even if 
a set of initial formulations is mutually consistent according to a certain 
person, say N. N., they need not offer the possibility of a system 
according to him. Some of the formulations may be self-evidently false. 
Moreover, he will not subscribe to possibilism if one of the 
formulations according to him is self-evidently true. There will, in that 
case, be a subclass of sets of the total class {E1& . . . &Fn} to which he 
cannot subscribe to as possibilities. In general, I shall characterize a 
possibilism as broader than another if the independent sets of consistent 
initial formulations taken as possible, according the former, includes 
those of the latter. 
  
The most inclusive possibilism states that, whatever the set of 
consistent initial formulations F1 . . . Fn of a total system, and there are 
such sets, every member of the class of sets {F& . . . &Fn} is a possible 
initial formulation of a system. 
  
This rules out the existence of self-evident initial formulations. 
 
Appendix 1. History, applied semantics and Gödel’s Theorem 
 
If S1 is “Columbus discovered America,” and S2 is “Leif Ericson 
discovered America,” the consistency or freedom from contradiction of 
the conjunction S1 & S2 clearly raises various problems of interest to 
what follows. They belong in part to applied formal logic, in part to 
applied semantics. “Columbus discovered America” and “Leif Ericson 
discovered America” both belong to a common language, or to two 
languages part of the vocabularies of which can be translated into each 
other. Actually, we shall simply accept that the sentences are meant to 
be ordinary English sentences. This language has no provisions such 
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that the two sentences are inconsistent. Complications arise with the 
historians, especially those of Italian or Scandinavian stock. They agree 
that Columbus and Leif Ericson were not contemporaries and view the 
possibility of joint simultaneous discovery as impossible. We should 
say, “highly” unlikely, perhaps “exceedingly” unlikely. Why not 
impossible? 
  
Because we hear, and in what follows we tentatively assume, that every 
question is potentially a scientific question, and that scientific 
methodology is relevant. Now, historians have elaborated a beautiful 
methodology for interpretation of texts. It is clear from those parts of 
the methodology that historians have in common, that certain sources of 
error are never completely eliminated. It is therefore methodologically 
unwise in a discussion at the professional, methodological level to 
pronounce it impossible that Columbus and Leif Ericson 
simultaneously discovered America. Actually, it would be a good 
exercise in a postgraduate seminar to let someone list the minimum set 
of auxiliary hypotheses necessary to make the co-discovery more likely 
than the separate or non-discovery. 
  
Our main conclusion here is that semantic or ordinary language 
considerations cannot furnish valid arguments for an unqualified 
answer of “impossible” to the question. I say “unqualified,” because 
one can rightly argue that the word “impossible” very often, and 
especially in loose talk, is used for what is rather unlikely and a little 
stupid to believe in. 
  
So much for the question of applied semantics. As for the questions of 
applied logic, I shall only argue that it is justifiable methodologically to 
apply symbols of formal logical calculi to sentences of ordinary 
languages for the purposes of conciseness in formulating general 
hypotheses. This application shall be strictly tentative. Perhaps it will 
turn out to be a source of confusion, perhaps not. 
  
Here is another point concerning applied semantics. At the end of 1, I 
offered two examples of a class S1&S2& . . . Sn} Here is a third 
question: “Did Columbus and Leif Ericson both discover America?” 
  
Let S1 be “There is a contradiction in Gödel’s proof of Gödel’s 
theorem” and S2 “Anything follows from Gödel’s proof of Gödel’s 
theorem.” The four conjunctions formed from S1 and S2 are not 
independent for all interpretations of “contradiction” and “anything 
follows from,” because according to some, a contradiction in a proof 
entails logically that anything follows from the proof, that is, from the 
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inconsistent set of propositions of the so-called proof. Whether it does 
entail this or not is, in part, a (formal) logical and in part a semantic 
question. Different explicit formal logical systems may be said to make 
“contradiction” and “follow from” more precise, but in different 
directions. There is no last step, it seems, in the process of making 
something more precise, and there is no supreme tribunal that can 
decide which directions of making precise (which direction of 
precization7) are the legitimate, correct, or most fruitful ones. 
  
For the purpose of this paper, we can only conclude, first, that at the 
professional level, concepts, criteria, and methodology of consistency, 
when carefully elaborated, branch out to form a tree in growth, rather 
than a dead stem. Or, to be less quasi-poetic: If a pair of sentences for 
some interpretations of “inconsistent” in some directions are 
inconsistent, this does not exclude the possibility that they are 
consistent according to other interpretations in the same or other 
directions. 
  
Second: An assertion that for at least one professionally 
unobjectionable interpretation a conjunction S1 & S2 are consistent is 
weaker, and sometimes very considerably weaker than the assertion that 
for all unobjectionable interpretations S1&S2 are consistent. 
  
As we shall see, these conclusions are important for possibilism, 
because of the limited efforts normally bestowed on a search for 
semantic premises making intuitively suspicious, queer, or paradoxical 
sets of sentences logically unobjectionable. We have, when provoked, a 
natural tendency to mobilize formal logic in support of common sense. 
 
Appendix 2. Validity, falsifiability, and total systems 
 
We have tentatively supposed, somewhat rashly, that if a total system is 
consistent, it is to be classed as valid, and that consistency is a sufficient 
criterion of validity. This view goes against certain views within 
philosophy of science. If a body of assertions have meaning, they are 
falsifiable, it is sometimes said. If, now, a total system is formulated 
explicitly and with care, it might obtain a kind of scientific status. There 
would be a concept of truth and testability, and the event might occur 
that the system was falsified. One might even grant that some queer 
new kinds of systems did not have notions of truth and testability and 
falsifiability very similar to those known to us today, and therefore to 
not assert that all total systems would be falsifiable. But there would 
remain an important class, systems modeled after what we might call a 
scientific theory. If assertions of a highly integrated scientific theory 
The Trumpeter 40 
 
 
taken as a whole suffers falsification, or at least disconfirmation if a set 
of methodologically unobjectionable observations goes against it, that 
is, against derived singular sentences (predictions). Why should not this 
be possible, whatever the scope of a theory? 
  
First, one must bear in mind that a sufficiently wide theory contains 
other things than mere assertions. It contains rules and postulates as 
well. These are not tested directly by observations. But as long as we 
presuppose the theory to be highly integrated, as many are today in 
physics, astronomy, and many other disciplines, rules and postulates 
within the theory are given up together, with the assertions, in case of 
falsification. And falsification does not mean separate falsification or 
disconfirmation by observation, one at a time. The falsificatory wave 
originating from one set of observations hits all parts of the theory, if it 
hits one. (If not, there is no integrated theory of which to speak.). 
  
Why should not a system of “unified science,” to take up a catch-word 
of Otto Neurath, be falsifiable or disconfirmable even if consistent? 
  
One main objection to the falsifiability has little to it, but deserves 
mentioning because of its importance in other connections. Scientific 
research done at a definite time and at a definite place belongs to a 
tradition, a general way of doing science, only partly articulated. Seen 
from without, this way of doing things is based on certain assumptions 
and presuppositions that are never questioned. They are normally not 
articulated, and if articulated, appear self-evident. How can these 
assumptions and presuppositions be falsified by members in the 
tradition? Obviously they cannot be, and will not be tested. And if all 
consistent rivals of a theory elaborated by the members of the tradition 
at least one point goes against the traditional assumptions and 
presuppositions, they cannot be adopted. Whatever the glaring 
shortcomings of the traditional theory, it will never be considered to be 
of a practical kind, disturbing influences from phenomena not covered 
by the theory, etc. The end of the affair will, history teaches us, be a 
kind of revolution whereby a new tradition is started. The old theory is 
not falsified or disconfirmed, but a new set of principles (basic 
assumptions and presuppositions) is adopted, and—as a matter of 
course, not involving observation—the old theory seen to be 
inconsistent with the new way of thinking, and ipso facto declared false. 
Adherents of the old slowly die out and so the time of controversy ends. 
  
The generalization to scientific total systems would be that falsification 
is out of the question, because of the even more important part played 
by assumptions and presuppositions. 




The argument does not, however, take into account the stipulation made 
from the very beginning: that a system, in order to fall into the category 
discussed here, must fulfill a requirement of explicitness. If a historian 
post festum is capable of finding out which are the assumptions and 
presuppositions of a researcher within a definite tradition or a definite 
time and place, we shall—safely, I think—assume that a genius at that 
time in that place might have “looked through” the tradition and 
somehow articulated the assumptions and presuppositions. The dictum 
that this would have been or is impossible can be argued from a 
sociology of knowledge of, for example, the Karl Mannheim class. I 
grant this class of sociologies the status of possible arguable sociologies 
today, but doubt their consistency. Anyhow, I shall proceed from the 
postulate that articulations always have been possible in principle, when 
a scientific theory had its roots in a strong tradition, and that therefore 
falsification or disconfirmation has not been impossible in principle. On 
the other hand, it remains to be considered what falsification means 
here. It is certainly very far from clear-cut falsification by observation. 
Some sort of consideration of simplicity and other non-observational 
factors enter. If they enter in a decisive way, it is necessary to ask: has 
the theory been shown to be invalid? 
Notes 
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity we presume texts consist of a series of sentences all 
capable of being true or false. 
2 It is scarcely to be expected that anybody could define a concept of non-interference 
fulfilling the task. 
3 What I have in mind is the sense P1 described by Siri Blom in her paper “Concerning 
a controversy on the meaning of ‘probability’,” Theoria, vol. 21. 
4 A preliminary sketch of the cognitive structure of the introduction to L’être et le 
néant I have published in Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskirt, 2, 1967. (“Bidrag til analyse av 
den kognitive struktur i ‘fenomenteorien’ i “L’être et le néant”.) 
5 Examples are not basic, and one can be a substitution for another, the two forming 
logically independent sentences. On the other hand, particular (singular) sentences 
may well be basic and indispensable. 
6 Actually, P. W. Zapffe has proposed a 10-dimensional score for dramas. From his 
general account, it can be clearly seen how the methodology of comparisons might be 
fixed in detail. 
7 The conceptual framework made use of here is introduced in my Communication 
and Argument, Allen & Unwin, London, 1967. This is now available as SWAN 
Volume 7. 
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